According to the current legal framework, I will solve this problem

The need to reform the Border Troops was associated with a change in threats to national security and the interests of Ukraine at the state border, which were mostly non-military in nature. All this required the creation of the State Border Guard Service on the basis of the Border Troops. The formation of this structure began in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine" adopted on April 3, 2003.

Civil Defense was improved through the establishment of the Ministry of Emergencies and Protection of the Population from the Consequences of the Chornobyl Accident at the Ministry of Chernobyl of Ukraine and the Republican Civil Defense Headquarters in accordance with the Decree of the President of Ukraine of October 28 , 1996.

In order to increase the level of protection of the population and territories from man-made and natural emergencies, to create a single state system of prevention and response both in peacetime and in special periods, on July 25, 2002 the Decree of the President of Ukraine approved the State Program of Civil Defense to the State Civil Protection Service, which was designed for the period up to 2012. On March 5, 2004, a new Regulation "On the Ministry of Emergencies and Protection of the Population from the Consequences of the Chornobyl Accident "was approved.

Thus, according to the current legislation, the Military Organization of the State is structurally formed in Ukraine, which includes the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, military units of the Ministry of Emergencies, the Security Service of Ukraine and other military formations. formed in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine. Modern changes in the geopolitical space require constant improvement of the security system of national interests of Ukraine, which necessitates functional and structural adjustments of both the Military Organization of the state as a whole and its components.

Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues concerning the creation of a reliable system of protection of Ukraine’s national interests do not allow us to consider this process logically complete.

Given the difficult economic situation in the country, the author proposes to consider only those issues that do not require significant additional investment.

In our opinion, one of the main problems in this area is the uncertainty of the hierarchy of regulations. According to experts, there is a certain sequence of formation of the regulatory framework of national security (NB). It looks like this: The concept of the National Bank – The Doctrine of the National Bank – The Strategy of the National Bank [11]. Our case: in 1993 the Military Doctrine of Ukraine was adopted and in 2004 clarified, while the Concept of National Security was approved only in 1997 (it was abolished by the Law "On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" of 2003).

At the time of the adoption of the Military Doctrine, the Constitution of Ukraine had not yet been adopted, nor had national values ??and interests been defined by law, nor, accordingly, possible threats in the process of their implementation. According to G. Sytnyk, "in 1993 it would be more logical to approve at the legislative level not the Military Doctrine, but the main directions, goals and objectives of state policy in the military sphere, to define the conceptual ideas of military reform" [12, p. 232]. Consequence: the vagueness of the definition of military threats to the national interests of Ukraine has led to many miscalculations in the formation of the structure and functions of both the ATS and its structural components.

Another problem in optimizing the field of military security is the low viability of regulations. This is due to the fact that most of them are accepted late, and the current ones are not specified in time. Therefore, many such documents do not correspond to modern realities. An example is the 1993 Military Doctrine, which lasted until July 2004. It proclaimed the neutral, non-aligned status of the state, while the political decision on Ukraine’s integration into NATO was made in 2002, and the new version of the Military Doctrine was enshrined in law only in 2004. In other words, the normative document that should regulate this or that process appears as a result of this process (for example, the State Program of Construction and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 1997).

The vagueness of the legal framework leads to such serious problems in the field of military security as the fact that there is no centralized management of the Military Organization of the state. Thus, the Law "On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" of 2003 states that the military organization of the state is a set of state authorities and military formations, which is already nonsense. After all, the term "organization" implies not only a set of elements, but also stable links between them and centralized management.

In our case, the IOC has no centralized management, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the President of Ukraine, who exercises leadership in the field of national security and defense, but is not the Supreme Commander-in- Chief of the Military Organization. At the same time, the heads of other law enforcement agencies are part of the Cabinet of Ministers – the highest body in the executive branch headed by the Prime Minister [1, p. 16 – 41]. In other words, it is impossible to understand who is running the VOD.

If there is no single management of the organization, then how can it function properly? Moreover, the IAU of Ukraine cannot really be considered as a single structure, or rather a system, with all the consequences that follow from it.

Since the main task of the IOC is to respond to military threats to the national interests of Ukraine, its implementation requires the coordinated activities of all its components, and without a single leadership of the entire structure it is impossible. According to the current legal framework, I will solve this problemdue to the adoption of a normative document that regulates the activities of law enforcement agencies in accordance with the specific situation.

Thus, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine of 2004 states that during a special period the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations and law enforcement agencies is exercised by the President of Ukraine through the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (if established ) … ". According to this document," the main military body for state defense planning, management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, coordination and control over the implementation of defense tasks by other military formations and law enforcement agencies … within the limits set by laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine and The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. "

The Law of Ukraine "On narrative essay ideas Defense" of October 5, 2000 clearly stipulates that in the field of preparation for the country’s defense law enforcement agencies coordinate their activities with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under its leadership carry out defense planning and participate in creating a unified management system for a special period. … As for the special period, the governing bodies, formations, units and institutions of other military formations are subordinated to the relevant bodies of military management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the manner prescribed by the General Staff. Similarly, the activities of law enforcement agencies during the fight against other threats are regulated (see the Law of Ukraine "On Combating Terrorism") [13, p. 180].

This solution cannot be considered optimal. Experience shows that the transience of the processes of emergence and transformation of threats is very high, and therefore the quality of the organization to respond to them in this way is very low, as it requires excessive time and resources. Another option is a spontaneous response, when one of the components independently takes over the functions of neutralizing this threat, which in itself cannot be legal and effective.

The other side of the problem of centralization of water management is the vague definition and delimitation of functions between its components. Which, in turn, makes it impossible to create optimal power structures of the state.

However, as noted in the works of some researchers [12, p. 215 – 216], the shortcomings of current legislation that reduce the effectiveness of the formation and functioning of the Military Organization of the state, this is not the end. Often certain provisions of regulations contradict each other, and the conceptual and categorical apparatus used in them does not withstand any criticism.

For example, we compare the definition of "military organization" in different laws of Ukraine.

The Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of National Security" interprets the Military Organization of the state as "a set of state authorities, military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, whose activities are under democratic civilian control by society and directly aimed at protecting Ukraine’s national interests from external and internal threats ".

According to the Law of Ukraine "On Democratic Civilian Control over the Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State", a military organization of the state is a set of bodies of state power, military formations formed in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, is directly aimed at solving problems of protection of the interests of the state from external and internal threats ".

Note the obvious fundamental inconsistencies in these definitions.

According to the first law, the activities of the IOC are aimed at protecting the national interests of Ukraine, and according to the second – only to protect the interests of the state. Since the concept of "interests of the state" is much narrower than the concept of "national interests" and is only a component of them, then, hence, the interests of society, the individual, it does not protect.

Another discrepancy was rightly noted by G. Sytnyk in the monograph "State Management of National Security of Ukraine" [12, p. 210 – 212]. According to both laws, the activities of the IOC are aimed at protection "from external and internal threats" and since, as the name of the second law implies, law enforcement agencies are not part of the IOD, this provides for the possibility of using the Armed Forces of Ukraine to perform specific internal functions.